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The title of this conference, The International Criminal Court and the 
Community of Nations, invokes the notion of an international community, 
while the organization of sessions structures our discussions today in part 
around the categories of states parties to the Rome Statute, on the one hand, 
and non-party states, on the other.  Accordingly, I have chosen to draw atten-
tion in my remarks to these groupings—international community, states par-
ties, and non-states parties.  Specifically, I will focus on how the institution-
alization of international criminal law through the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the consequent division of the world 
into states parties and non-states parties to the Rome Statute, may undermine 
the notion that the international community as a whole condemns mass atroc-
ity crimes. 
I will begin with the idea of international community, and its connection 
to the field of international criminal law, and then I will turn to the division of 
the field into parties and non-parties, or supporters and opponents, of the ICC.   
Lawyers and scholars of international law and international relations have 
struggled to construct a uniform understanding of the concept of an “interna-
tional community.”  The concept is heavily used in cases, in treaties, and in 
scholarly writing, often without much explanation, as if its meaning is self-
evident.   
By international community, I mean a conception of international commu-
nity distinct from a mere collection of states, or even a collection of states 
bound together by shared rules established in pursuit of some common inter-
est.  Rather, international community can be understood as a collection of 
states and other actors that constitutes a community because of a set of shared 
values.   
The history of the international community and the history of international 
criminal law are closely intertwined, as Nuremberg is often identified as a 
moment when international community was born.  As Christian Tomuschat 
writes, with the Nuremberg trial, as well as the creation of the United Nations, 
“[a]ll of a sudden . . . it appeared that there was a common moral ground 
acknowledged by all states that demanded respect and could eventually be 
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enforced through common institutions.”1  It is that sense of international com-
munity—a community built around shared values, a common ground of mo-
rality—that underlies the notion that an international community was born 
with the Nuremberg tribunal.  Moreover, it was that sense of international 
community that allowed for the Nuremberg tribunal to exist. 
What were those shared values at the heart of the project of international 
criminal law?  Rule of law; a conviction that no one, no matter how powerful, 
is above the law; a shared intolerance for the crimes of the cruelty and mag-
nitude of those that had taken place during the Second World War; and a con-
viction that the lives of victims are more important than the power of any 
person or government.  Consistent with theories of international cooperation 
that conceptualize institutionalization as arising out of “common identities,”2 
this idea of a set of shared values has continued to drive the field of interna-
tional criminal law.  Antonio Cassese notes that an essential feature of the 
substantive prohibitions of international criminal law themselves is their “in-
ten[tion] to protect values considered important by the whole international 
community.”3  And along with the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for the for-
mer Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Rome Statute itself draws on this notion of 
common interest or identity.  The preamble begins with a reference to the 
drafters’ consciousness “that all peoples are united by common bonds, their 
cultures pieced together in a shared heritage.”4  It acknowledges the roots of 
the Court, of the movement for international justice, in the unimaginable 
atrocities of the twentieth century against millions of children, women, and 
men that shocked the “conscience of humanity.”5 
The “international” in international criminal law thus represents far more 
than a mere demarcation of jurisdiction in international courts, rather than do-
mestic ones; and it has significance beyond identifying that the sources of law 
for these courts are treaties or customary international law, rather than domes-
tic statutes.  Instead, international criminal law is international because it is a 
body of law and a set of institutions that are understood to represent shared 
global values.   
But in the years since the creation of the ICC, the common value of intol-
erance for mass atrocity crimes has had to exist alongside a new purported 
common value:  the value of support for the prosecution by the ICC of those 
who commit those crimes.  The tension for the international community, then, 
is that the field has become institutionalized—but not universally.  The 
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creation of the Rome Statute means not only that there are parties, but also 
non-parties.   
And these are not supportive non-parties, nor are they uninterested non-
parties, content to sit on the sidelines.  The early years of the ICC of course 
featured some opposition from prominent non-parties, but those early years 
also saw toleration from non-parties for the activities of the Court, such as the 
decisions by China and the United States to abstain in the Security Council’s 
decision to refer the situation in Darfur to the Court.6  But over time, some 
non-parties have shifted away from positions of support or indifference.  We 
are now living in the world of angry, defiant non-parties—of the John Boltons 
who say the Court is dead to them7 and the Burundis who “rejoice” in this 
display of American fury toward the ICC.8 
If we compare the world of international criminal law today to what ex-
isted in the 1990s, as David Tolbert discusses in his contribution to this sym-
posium,9 there appears to have been broader global support for the values of 
intolerance for mass atrocity crimes then versus now.  Even if we compare the 
world of international criminal law today to what existed in the late 2000s, a 
time when I was in the U.S. government advising on the ICC’s new case 
against Omar al Bashir, opposition to the Court is more extreme.  
So, what are we to make of this apparent decline in support, and the attacks 
on the Court?  If opposition to the Court could be understood as mere opposi-
tion to one particular institution, to one particular treaty, perhaps it would not 
be so alarming to those who count themselves as advocates of greater intoler-
ance for mass atrocity crimes.  But opposition to the Court is not merely op-
position to one institution.  And that is because the prevailing understanding 
is that the ICC is not just one institution; it is not just one treaty regime. 
Instead, the ICC is viewed often as the culmination of the development of 
the field of international criminal law—it is the ultimate goal, the crowning 
achievement.  In scholarly, practice, and public circles, the ICC has become 
synonymous with the entire field of international criminal law—and for some, 
the entire project of accountability for mass atrocity crimes.  
 
 6   See U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005) 
(recording vote on Security Council Resolution 1593, referring situation in Darfur to the 
ICC Prosecutor). 
 7 See National Security Adviser John Bolton on Global Threats and National Security, 
C-SPAN (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?451213-1/national-security-ad-
viser-john-bolton-addresses-federalist-society (“For all intents and purposes, the ICC is 
dead to us.”). 
 8 See Matt Apuzzo & Marlise Simmons, U.S. Attack on I.C.C. Is Seen as Bolstering 
World’s Despots, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/wor 
ld/europe/icc-burundi-bolton.html. 
     9 David Tolbert, Looking Forward and Looking Back: How Can the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC) Navigate in a Complicated and Largely Hostile World, 47 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 659 (2019).  
638 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 47:635 
The creation of the ICC is, of course, a massive achievement in the field 
of international criminal justice.  But it has also been viewed as the highest 
achievement of the field.  And along with that, prosecution in the ICC has 
become a primary lens for examining and understanding justice in the context 
of mass atrocity, and for understanding success in the fight against mass atroc-
ity crimes.  We come together today, for example, not to discuss how to pre-
vent mass atrocity crimes, and not even to address the broader array of efforts 
at accountability such as the rise of universal jurisdiction prosecutions in re-
cent days.  Instead, we come together today to focus our attention on the ICC.  
And in part as a result of this association of the Court with the broader 
field, the division of the international community around the issue of the Court 
has come to represent a larger division around the very ideas behind the 
Court—that intolerance for mass atrocity crimes, and the refusal to let the 
systematic infliction of suffering go unnoticed.  This conflation of the ICC 
and international criminal law means that the common values that once were 
the province of the entire field have become the territory of the Court.  And 
with the division of the world into parties and non-parties, the values associ-
ated with the field, that are now increasingly tied to the Court, become the 
property of a subset of states rather than the whole.  They become representa-
tions of the values of some, but not all.  
Perhaps this is just a necessary reckoning with the fact that there is not a 
unified international community behind this intolerance for mass crime.  But 
to the extent we find there is still broad intolerance for these acts that consti-
tute the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, we should remember that the 
ICC is just a court, and the Rome Statute just a treaty.  
We might do well to separate the substantive norms from the procedural 
institution set up to protect them in a particular way.  That is, the recognition 
of this fracturing can be taken as a call, once again, to remember that the ICC 
is just one institution; and it is one institution that dispenses one form of jus-
tice.  The seeming disintegration of the international community around the 
work of the ICC might indeed be a fracturing of a community that once existed 
around shared intolerance for mass victimization; or it might be a fracturing 
of the community (or a recognition that there was no such community) that 
favored this particular method of enforcement.  
I propose, then, that the division of the world into states parties and non-
states parties, for those of us who support the larger project of international 
reckoning for mass atrocity crimes, should serve as another call for pluraliza-
tion of these efforts to protect the substantive norms, and for greater attention 
to the political and cultural work that needs to be done alongside the legal 
work.  
 
